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ABSTRACT
We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms.
Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell side equity analysts and senior officers
of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts’ school ties to senior officers impart comparative information
advantages in the production of analyst research.  We find evidence that analysts outperform on their
stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy
of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without
ties earns returns of 5.40% per year.  We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective
disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg
FD the return premium from school ties was 8.16% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium
is nearly zero and insignificant.  In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure
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  Certain agents play key roles in revealing information into securities 
markets. In the equities market, security analysts are among the most important.  
A large part of an analyst’s job is to research, produce, and disclose reports 
forecasting aspects of companies’ future prospects, and to translate their forecasts 
into stock recommendations. Therefore, isolating how, or from whom, analysts 
obtain the information they use to produce their recommendations is important. 
  In this paper we investigate ties between sell-side analysts and management 
of public firms, and the subsequent performance of analysts’ stock 
recommendations. We exploit common past experiences, namely attendance at 
identical educational institutions, to identify firms where analysts are more likely 
to gain direct access to senior management.  An advantageous aspect of our 
network ties is that they are formed far before the information likely being 
transferred across them, and that the underlying tie (ex. alumni link) is not 
directly related to the type of information likely being transmitted years later (ex. 
company related information).  
  Our main goal is to test the hypothesis that analysts gain comparative 
information advantages through their social networks; specifically, through 
educational ties with senior officers and board members of firms that they cover. 
We test this hypothesis by building portfolios that replicate sell-side analysts’ 
recommendations and by comparing how analysts perform on firms to which they 
have ties, relative to firms to which they do not. We test this hypothesis for the 
universe of sell-side analysts and publicly traded domestic firms for which we are 
able to collect data on the educational background of both the analyst and senior 
officers of the firm she covers.  
  To better understand our approach, consider the following example. In 1992, 
two sell-side analysts covered XYZ Corp.
1 One analyst, Mr. Smith, shares a 
connection with the firm, defined as having attended the same academic institution 
as a member of the board of directors or a senior officer. Among the other stocks 
he covers, Mr. Smith is also linked to CFM Corp., another large cap stock in the 
                                                 
1 This example comes directly from our sample, however we mask the firms’ and analysts’ names. 
We also alter the calendar dates.  
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same industry. The second analyst, Mr. Jones, shares no educational link to either 
firm. As of December 1992, both analysts and the IBES consensus (median) rate 
the stock as a "HOLD".
2 
  On February 10th, 1993, prior to market opening, Mr. Smith deviated from 
the consensus and upgraded XYZ to a BUY rating. He held the BUY rating until 
the stock delisted in December 1993. Mr. Jones maintained (and later reiterated) a 
HOLD rating, reflecting the consensus recommendation. Mr. Jones eventually 
dropped the stock from coverage, while the consensus recommendation remained a 
HOLD until the delisting date. 
  Following Mr. Smith’s upgrade, two major events pushed up XYZ’s stock 
price. Immediately after the upgrade, on February 11, 1993, XYZ reported higher 
fourth-quarter and full-year earnings, beating the consensus expectation.  Then, in 
October 1993, CFM Corp. announced its intention to acquire XYZ. XYZ’s price 
rose 15.7% on the news. The merger was completed in December 1993. Figure 1 
illustrates this timeline of events.  
 Between  February  10th,  1993 and December 1993 XYZ’s stock price rose by 
78.6%. An investor who purchased the stock after Mr. Smith’s bullish call would 
have outperformed a characteristic-adjusted benchmark by 52.9% over an 11-
month period.  
  More generally, XYZ and CFM are not the only securities where Mr. Smith 
had an educational connection to management. Between 1993 and 2006, Mr. Smith 
covered a variety of stocks. Looking at his recommendations over time reveals his 
tendency of producing superior advice on stocks where he shares a school link with 
a member of the board of directors or a senior officer of the firm. Between 1993 
and 2006 a calendar time portfolio replicating his BUY recommendations (with a 1 
day lag) in stocks to which he shares a link outperformed a characteristic-adjusted 
benchmark portfolio by 1.17% per month; the corresponding abnormal returns on 
his non-linked calls was only 0.01%. 
  The results in this example represent a much more systematic pattern 
                                                 
2 The consensus rating refers to the average across all analysts covering the stock; we do not have 
educational information on the remaining analysts.  
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across the universe of sell-side equity analysts. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
educational ties facilitate the transmission of private information, we find that 
analysts produce significantly better recommendations on firms to which they have 
an educational tie, relative to firms to which they do not. 
    Analysts’  buy  recommendations  on school-tied stocks outperform buy 
recommendations on non-tied stocks by an average of 45 basis points per month 
(t=3.87), using 12-month calendar time portfolios following the recommendations. 
Therefore, a calendar time portfolio strategy exploiting only this school-tie 
informational advantage on buys, translates into roughly 5.40% outperformance 
per year. The return differential is largely unaffected after controlling for other 
determinants of returns such as size, book-to-market, and momentum.   
Importantly, since our approach exploits variation within an analyst’s portfolio 
(i.e., performance on tied versus non-tied stocks), our results are not simply an 
artifact of a selected sample of "smart" or skilled analysts.  
  We do not find a similar return differential on the analysts’ sell 
recommendations. Analysts’ school-tied sells perform roughly the same as their 
non-tied sell recommendation stocks following the recommendations. One 
explanation consistent with this finding is that managers are willing to reveal 
positive (but not negative) information about their firms. Alternatively, this would 
be consistent with analysts obtaining both good and bad news from their school-
tied firms, but perhaps as part of a tacit agreement, acting only on the positive 
news. 
  There could be a number of mechanisms that allow information to be 
transferred along the networks. It may be that alumni networks allow analysts 
cheaper access to firm-level material information, which then allows them to form 
superior recommendations. For example, the analyst may have access to explicitly 
private conference calls with firm officials, or the network may simply reduce the 
cost to the analyst of obtaining or analyzing information about the firm (ex. the 
analyst can obtain information about upcoming earnings with fewer calls to the 
firm). Alternatively, the education network may simply allow analysts to better 
assess managerial quality. Under this mechanism, there is not a constant flow of  
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information in the network from the firm to the analyst, but instead some inherent 
information within the network about managerial quality (ex. all members of the 
Dartmouth network know that the Dartmouth CEO of firm ABC is quite good, 
while the Dartmouth CEO of XYZ is not).  
  In order to distinguish between these two alternatives, we exploit a 
regulation introduced during our sample period explicitly aimed at blocking the 
former mechanism of selective information transfer: Regulation FD, instated by the 
SEC in October of 2000. The regulation quite openly gave as its aim the ending of 
selective disclosure by firms to a subset of market participants. For instance, in the 
SEC release regarding Regulation FD, the aim was given to stop the occurrence 
that: "a privileged few gain an informational edge -- and the ability to use that 
edge to profit -- from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from 
their skill, acumen, or diligence." The SEC went on to caution that it was these 
selective disclosure relationships that allowed agents to: "exploit `unerodable 
informational advantages´ derived not from hard work or insights, but from their 
access to corporate insiders.
3" Our educational social networks may represent 
exactly this type of `unerodable informational advantage´ that the SEC targeted 
with Regulation FD. Specifically, if the channel that allows analysts to produce 
superior recommendations on school-tied stocks is selective disclosure, we may 
expect this superior ability to be attenuated post-Regulation FD. However, if the 
education network simply measures analysts’ increased ability to assess managerial 
quality for CEOs they attended school with, it is not clear this would be affected 
at all by Regulation FD.  
  We test this hypothesis by splitting our sample to observe analysts’ ability 
on school-tied stocks pre- and post-Regulation FD. All of our evidence points to 
selective disclosure being the main mechanism of information transfer along the 
network. All of our effects are positive, large, and significant pre-Regulation FD, 
and small and insignificant post-Regulation FD.  The monthly returns of the long-
short calendar time portfolio on the differences between school-tied and non-school-
                                                 
3 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24, 2000).  
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tied stocks pre-Regulation FD is 68 basis points per month (t=4.36), or 8.16% per 
year. Post-Regulation FD, this difference is only 14 basis points per month, and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero (t=0.84).  Further, the difference between 
the long-short portfolio returns in the two periods is large (55 basis points) and 
statistically significant (t=2.38).  To test this more carefully, we also run panel 
regressions of returns on buy recommendations on a connection dummy variable, a 
post-Reg FD dummy variable, an interaction term (connected*post-Reg FD), and 
a host of firm, brokerage, and analyst-level control variables.  Consistent with our 
results from the calendar-time portfolios, we find that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is strongly negative, while the combined effect (interaction 
term+connected) is small (10bp) and insignificant (F-statistic of 1.18), indicating 
that the school-tie premium is largely absent in the post-Reg FD period.  In a 
separate set of regressions, we also show that the number of school ties an analyst 
possesses with her covered stocks strongly increases the likelihood of becoming an 
"All-Star" analyst (a 2 standard deviation increase in connections more than 
doubles the probability from 9.2% to 20.1%), but only in the pre-Reg FD period; 
this result further highlights the value of social networks in precisely those times 
when selective disclosure is least inhibited.   
  We construct an out-of-sample test of the impact of Reg FD by replicating 
our results in the United Kingdom, where there was no such law enacted at this 
time.
4 Over the entire sample period, we again find a large school-tie return 
premium on buy recommendations for UK-listed stocks: a long-short portfolio that 
purchases linked buy recommendations and shorts non-linked buy 
recommendations earns 187 basis points per month (t=2.79) in raw returns, and 
167 basis points per month (t=2.20) in abnormal returns.  However, unlike in the 
US, we see no significant difference in this premium between the pre- and post-Reg 
FD time periods. 
                                                 
4 Regulations prohibiting the selective disclosure of material information by UK-listed firms have 
been a part of UK law for decades since rules on insider dealing came into force in the 1980s.  
Conversations with practitioners in the UK indicate that although clarifications and enhancements 
to these norms were put into effect in 2001 (through the Financial Services and Markets Act) and 
2005 (via the Market Abuse Directive), these acts were generally not viewed as structural shifts in 
the disclosure environment in the same way that Regulation FD in the US was designed to be.  
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  Lastly we perform a number of robustness checks. We find that the school-
tie outperformance is present in both large and small cap stocks, and for stocks 
with both high and low analyst coverage. In addition, the effect is present in both 
Ivy league and non-Ivy league connections between analyst and firm, and is nearly 
unaffected by controlling for school-level returns at the stock level.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper 
provides a brief background and literature review, while Section II describes the 
data on both firms and analysts. Section III provides the main results on analyst 
ability and sell-side school ties. Section IV explores the mechanism for information 
transfer across the network, while Section V examines alternative hypotheses. 
Section VI concludes.  
   
I.  Background and literature review 
The opinions of sell-side equity analysts are among the most widely 
solicited, anticipated, and dissected news items in the stock market each day. 
Further, since analyst data is available in large quantities and in relatively 
standardized formats, the sell-side analyst industry offers an ideal testing ground 
for a number of theories of economic behavior. In this paper we use this testing 
ground to investigate the idea that agents’ educational ties facilitate the 
transmission of private information into security markets. 
A large literature on analyst performance supports the idea that analysts 
bring valuable information to the market, and have incentives to do so. Numerous 
studies document the potential profitability of trading on analyst recommendations 
(see, for example, Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001, 2003), Jegadeesh et al. 
(2004)) and earnings forecast revisions (see Stickel (1991) and Gleason and Lee 
(2003), among others).
5 Of course, sell-side analysts have an incentive to produce 
unbiased forecasts and recommendations for investors only if they are compensated 
for such behavior. Due to a lack of data on direct compensation, the literature 
                                                 
5 See also Michaely and Womack (2007), who combine information from recommendations and 
earnings forecasts data and show that the subset of upgraded/downgraded recommendations 
"supported" by an earnings forecast revision in the same direction are the most profitable 
recommendations.  
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generally tests this idea by linking analyst behavior to measures of implicit 
incentives or career concerns. Stickel (1992) finds that highly rated “All-American” 
analysts (who are typically better compensated than other analysts) are more 
accurate earnings forecasters than other analysts, suggesting that accuracy is 
rewarded. Similarly, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) document that poor 
relative performance leads to job turnover.  
An important strand of the literature, however, suggests that analysts’ 
career concerns and the conflicts of interest inherent in equity research create an 
agency problem, potentially at the expense of investors who trust analyst research 
to be unbiased. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), find that younger analysts 
deviate less from the consensus than their older counterparts, consistent with the 
predictions of reputation-based herding models.
6 Hong and Kubik (2003) report 
that controlling for accuracy, analysts who are optimistic relative to the consensus 
are more likely to experience favorable job separations. They also find that 
analysts are judged less on accuracy than optimism when it comes to stocks 
underwritten by their employers, supporting allegations that analysts suffer from a 
conflict of interest when covering stocks affiliated with their brokerage houses.
7 
Since we can control for investment banking affiliations, we can distinguish 
information effects from these agency effects throughout the paper. 
Our paper is unique in that we try to isolate a channel through which 
analysts acquire valuable information. As such, our work is related to the recent 
passage of Regulation FD. Effective October 23, 2000, companies must reveal any 
material information to all investors and analysts simultaneously in the case of 
intentional disclosures, or within 24 hours in the case of unintentional disclosures. 
According to SEC Proposed Rule S7-31-99, regulators believe that allowing 
selective disclosure is "not in the best interests of investors or the securities 
markets generally." Several recent papers examining the impact of Regulation FD 
on the behavior of equity analysts conclude that the law has in fact been effective 
                                                 
6 Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Lamont (2002) find similar results for mutual fund managers 
and macroeconomic forecasters, respectively. Also see Holmström (1999) and Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) for related work on career concerns. 
7 Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Lin, McNichols, and O'Brien 
(2005) also report evidence in support of this view.  
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in curtailing selective disclosure to analysts (see, for example, Mohanram and 
Sunder (2006), Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006), and Gintschel and Markov 
(2004)). Since our tests explore a specific possible channel of selective disclosure, 
they are relevant to this debate.
8  
Our empirical identification is similar to Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 
(2007), who exploit educational connections between mutual fund managers and 
corporate board members to identify information transfer through social networks. 
The use of corporate board linkages as a measure of personal networks is common 
in the network sociology literature (see, for example, Mizruchi (1982, 1992), Useem 
(1984)). Board linkages are typically isolated by looking at direct board interlocks 
between firms (as in Hallock (1997), "back-door" links among directors across firms 
(as in Larcker et al. (2005) and Conyon and Muldoon (2006)), or direct and 
indirect links between board members and government agencies or officials (as in 
Faccio (2006) and Fisman et al. (2006), among others), and have shown to be 
important mechanisms for the sharing of information and the adoption of common 
practices across firms.
9 Our approach is different in that we focus on direct links 
between board members and equity analysts via shared educational backgrounds.  
 
II.  Data 
  The data in this study is collected from several sources. We search public 
filings and other miscellaneous information available over the World Wide Web to 
construct a novel database of educational backgrounds of sell-side analysts issuing 
recommendations on US domestic stocks. 
  We start by identifying all sell-side analysts on the I/B/E/S tape who 
provide at least one recommendation on a domestic stock between 1993 and 2006. 
For each analyst, I/B/E/S provides a numeric identifier, the analyst’s last name, 
                                                 
8 See also Malloy (2005), who shows that geographically proximate analysts produce more accurate 
forecasts, but do so both before and after the enactment of Regulation FD; as well as Groysberg, 
Healy, Chapman, Shanthikumar, and Gui (2007), who document a decline in the forecast accuracy 
advantage of sell-side analysts over buy-side analysts after the enactment of Regulation FD.   
9 Examples of the latter include the adoption of poison pills (Davis (1991)), corporate acquisition 
activity (Haunschild (1993)), CEO compensation (Khurana (2002)), and the decision to make 
political contributions (Mizruchi (1992)).  
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the initial of his/her first name, and a code corresponding the analyst’s brokerage 
firm. We use the broker translation file to reconstruct the name of the brokerage 
house. Since our data construction methodology involves name searches, we delete 
observations with multiple names for a given numeric identifier or multiple 
identifiers for a given name. Finally, we discard teams, since I/B/E/S provides 
only the team members’ last names but not their first name. This leads to an 
initial list of 8,620 analysts issuing recommendations between 1993 and 2006. 
  We hand-collect analysts’ educational backgrounds from a variety of 
sources. Our main data source is Zoominfo.com, a search engine that specializes in 
collecting and indexing biographical and employment data from publicly available 
documents over the Web. From this site, we obtain each analyst’s full name, job 
title, present and past employment history and the stocks covered in order to 
correctly identify an analyst in our initial set. We supplement the initial search 
with the BrokerCheck search engine available on the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority website, which contains background information on current and former 
FINRA-registered security investment professionals. Finally, if we are unable to 
determine the analyst’s educational background using our primary sources, we use 
other available sources over the Web on a case-by-case basis to collect additional 
information. In building our final sample we use a conservative approach and 
discard observations where we are unable to uniquely associate an analyst with a 
specific educational background. This occurs either due to disagreement between 
multiple sources, or because we are unable to correctly identify the analyst.
10 For 
each analyst we collect the name of the academic institution attended for either an 
undergraduate or a graduate degree.
11 
                                                 
10 For example, if according to I/B/E/S a person named A. Summer covers technology stocks for 
Goldman Sachs in 1999, but our web searches uncover an Alan Summer and an Amy Summer, both 
of whom were analysts for Goldman Sachs covering technology stocks in 1999, we would not be able 
to uniquely match this analyst. 
11 One drawback of our dataset is that graduation years are missing for 70% of the final sample 
since most of the data is extracted from company releases or other public filings, which tend to 
omit graduation years. Information on degree type is also missing for about 35% of analysts. We 
have tried to collect these additional data items from each academic institution’s alumni network 
but have been unable to collect a large enough sample to date, since many universities restrict 
access to their alumni network and/or require written consent of the alumnus before releasing this 
information.  
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  Biographical information for boards of directors and senior company officers 
is provided by Boardex of Management Diagnostics Limited. The data contain 
relational links among board of directors and other corporate officials. Links in the 
dataset are constructed by cross-referencing employment history, educational 
background and professional qualifications. For each firm, we use the link file to 
reconstruct the annual time series of identities and educational background of 
board members and senior officers (defined as CEO, CFO or Chairman). The final 
data contain current and past roles of company officials with start-year and end-
year, a board dummy and the academic institution for undergraduate and graduate 
degree (where available). We hand match institutions from our analyst data and 
Boardex and create a unique numeric identifier.
12 
  Finally, we match the firms associated with all company officials and sell-
side analysts to accounting and stock return data from CRSP/COMPUSTAT. Our 
final sample includes educational background data on 1,820 analysts issuing a total 
of 56,994 recommendations over 5,132 CRSP stocks between October 30th, 1993 
and December 20th, 2006.  
  Table I reports summary statistics for the matched samples of firms-boards-
analysts. From Panel A, we average 604 analysts and 5,746 recommendations per 
year, which comprise 23% of the universe of sell-side analysts and 23% of the total 
number of recommendations per year.
13  Our sample of firms averages 1,705 per 
year, which comprise 74% of total market value of CRSP stocks covered by sell-
side analysts. 
  In Panel B we report summary statistics by firm-year or analyst-year. The 
typical analyst in our sample covers 14 stocks while the mean coverage per firm is 
around 5 analysts. The average size percentile is 0.78 while the average book-to-
market percentile in 0.37, reflecting the known fact that analyst coverage tends to 
                                                 
12 See also Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) for additional details on data construction and 
matching using the BoardEx data. 
13  Note that in unreported tests we have verified that the characteristics of our sample are very 
similar to those of the entire database of I/B/E/S recommendations over this time period (e.g., in 
terms of the proportion of buys/sells; average calendar-time portfolio returns of all buy 
recommendations, etc.).  Also, as noted earlier, since our approach exploits variation within an 
analyst’s portfolio (i.e., performance on tied versus non-tied stocks), our findings are not simply an 
artifact of a selected sample of "smart" or skilled analysts.  
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be skewed towards larger cap growth stocks. 
  Table II reports summary statistics on our sample, broken down by 
academic institution. Panel A reports the average number of analyst ties to senior 
corporate officials, while Panel B reports the average number of analyst ties to firm 
boards of directors. Harvard University accounts for 18.53% of analyst ties to 
senior officials in our sample, and 18.22% of analyst ties to corporate boards; Ivy 
League schools in general account for 43.72% of analyst ties to senior officials, and 
48.51% of analyst ties to corporate boards.
14 
 
III.  Results: Returns to sell-side recommendations 
In this section we examine the stock return performance of recommendations 
by sell-side analysts on securities to which they have school ties.  We formally test 
the hypothesis that recommendations issued on stocks with school ties outperform 
recommendations issued on stocks without ties. 
To assess the relative performance of sell-side recommendations we use a 
standard calendar time portfolio approach.
15 We classify a stock as having 
educational ties to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior 
officer (defined as either the CEO, CFO, or Chairman of board) or a board 
member. 
We use the I/B/E/S numeric recommendation code to assign each 
recommendation to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all 
stocks upgraded relative to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or 
reiterated coverage with a buy or strong buy rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, 
consisting of all stocks downgraded relative to the previous recommendation, 
initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold, sell or strong sell rating, or 
dropped from coverage by the analyst. We also consider a version of both 
portfolios using only upgrades or downgrades. If the brokerage house does not 
report a stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or 
                                                 
14 Note that our results are not driven by a few particular schools (e.g., Ivy League), as we show 
later in the paper. 
15 See also Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2005), and Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman 
(2005).  
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reiterated within twelve months, we let it expire.  
Our portfolios are constructed as follows.  For the BUY portfolio, we begin by 
identifying each BUY recommendation as described above. For each buy 
recommendation, we skip a trading day between the recommendation date t and 
investment, and purchase the recommended stock at the close of day t+1. By 
waiting a trading day we exclude the recommendation-date returns and ensure 
that the portfolios are based on available information.
16 Each recommended stock 
remains in the portfolio until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or 
the underlying recommendation expires. Again, we skip a day between an event 
that causes a stock to be unloaded and the actual disinvestment: e.g. if a stock is 
downgraded at date t, we unwind the position at the close of date t+1. If more 
than one analyst recommends a particular stock on a given date, then the stock 
will appear multiple times in the portfolio, once for each recommendation.  
Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time portfolios by averaging 
across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the analyst’s 
recommendation code. For the BUY portfolio, we reverse-score the 
recommendation codes so that a Strong Buy is set equal to 5 (instead of 1, as it is 
in the raw data) and a Strong Sell is set equal to 1, so that a higher weight 
indicates a relatively more bullish recommendation. We use the exact same method 
for the SELL portfolio, with the exception that in the final step we use the actual 
recommendation codes as portfolio weights; i.e., a Strong Buy is set equal to 1 and 
a Strong Sell is set equal to 5, so that a higher weight indicates a relatively more 
bearish recommendation.  
This approach yields a time series of returns for each portfolio and has the 
advantage of corresponding to a simple investment strategy of following sell-side 
recommendations, mimicking both the directional advice and the holding period 
implied by the timing of the revisions. 
For each stock, we compute risk-adjusted ("DGTW") returns as in Daniel et 
al. (1997) by subtracting the return on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP 
                                                 
16 I/B/E/S does not provide a time stamp, hence for recommendations issued prior to 9.30am this 
approach excludes the first two trading-day' returns.  
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firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-to-book ratio, and one year 
momentum quintile, from the stock’s raw return. We update the 125 characteristic 
portfolios at the end of June of each year using conditional sorts, and adjust the 
market-to-book ratios using the 48-industry classifications from Ken French’s 
website.
17 
Table III presents calendar time portfolio returns for our sample of BUY 
recommendations, and illustrates one of our main results. BUY recommendations 
with school ties earn 1.49% per month in raw returns, while BUY 
recommendations without school ties earn 1.04%. A long/short portfolio which 
purchases stocks after BUY recommendations by school-tied analysts and shorts 
stocks after BUY recommendations by non-school-tied analysts earns 45 basis 
points per month (t=3.87), which translates into an annual premium of 5.40%.  
This long/short portfolio has the advantage that it conditions on the signal of the 
recommendation (BUY in both cases), and so isolates solely the school-tie premium 
portion of the analysts’ recommendations.  If we restrict the sample to ties to 
senior officials only (rather than to senior managers or anyone on the board of 
directors), the return on this long-short portfolio increases to 55 basis points per 
month (t=3.75). The risk-adjusted abnormal returns are given in the third and 
fourth columns of Table III. The buy recommendations on stocks without school 
ties earn basically a zero abnormal return. In contrast, the buy recommendations 
on stocks where the analyst has school ties continue to outperform in abnormal 
returns, resulting in the school-tied premium being largely unaffected by the other 
return determinants (40 basis points, (t=4.63)).  
The last two columns of Panel A report portfolio returns for the subset of 
upgrades only (i.e., upgrades to buy or strong buy only, excluding initiations and 
reiterations). The long-short portfolio of tied minus untied upgrades again earns 
large returns, ranging from 29 to 37 basis points per month over the full sample 
period. 
Panel B of Table III presents results for the sample of SELL 
recommendations. Column 2 of Panel A indicates that we are unable to reject the 
                                                 
17 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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hypothesis of no difference between the raw returns of sell recommendations by 
analysts with school ties and those without. The next two columns extend these 
findings to DGTW-adjusted returns. For the sample of analysts with links to the 
board of directors, the returns on sell recommendations by analysts with school ties 
are actually significantly higher than those by analysts without ties. However, this 
result is not robust to the subsample of downgrades, or the subsample of ties to 
senior officials; the magnitude on the long-short portfolio is also fairly modest.  
  Overall, our calendar time portfolio tests on the buy recommendations of 
linked analysts reveal an economically and statistically significant channel through 
which analysts produced superior recommendations. Our results on sell 
recommendations suggest that either this information advantage does not extend 
to negative information, or that incentives not to reveal such negative information 
are strong. 
 
IV.  Mechanism 
  Our results on the outperformance of buy recommendations by analysts 
with school ties suggest a statistically and economically important channel for the 
transfer of private information. In this section we explore possible hypotheses 
regarding the manner in which this information might be conveyed, the impact of 
school ties on analyst status, and the types of information being transferred across 
these networks. 
  As noted above, our main test to distinguish between direct information 
transfer as the driver of our findings versus superior assessments of managerial 
quality is to split the sample pre- and post-Reg FD.  The pre-Reg FD period was 
allegedly a time period plagued with problems of selective disclosure between firms 
and equity analysts, and the law put in place was expressly designed to curb these 
practices. Table IV shows that the large returns to school ties on buy 
recommendations are concentrated in the pre-Reg FD period (68 basis points per 
month, or 8.16% (t=4.36) per year, pre- Reg FD for the long-short portfolio return, 
compared to only 14 basis points (t=0.84) post-Reg FD).  The average monthly 
difference between the long-short portfolio returns in the two periods is large, 55  
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basis points, and statistically significant (t=2.38). Table V reports results for sell 
recommendations, splitting the sample in the same way; not surprisingly given our 
earlier results on sells, we find no significant differences between the two periods 
for sell recommendations.  
   The motivation expressed by the SEC in their release
18 on Regulation FD 
suggests that the school ties we identify in our tests are exactly the sort of private 
information channel between firms and analysts that the regulation was designed 
to address. The fact that our results are significantly weaker in the post-Reg FD 
period suggests that the regulation was effective in curbing the apparent 
information advantage that analysts gain through their school networks. 
  To test this idea more formally, we employ panel regressions of returns on 
buy recommendations on a connection dummy variable, a post-Reg FD dummy 
variable, an interaction term (connected*post-Reg FD), and a host of firm, broker, 
and analyst-level control variables. The dependent variables are either returns 
(Ret) or abnormal returns (Xeret), where indicated; abnormal returns are daily 
DGTW-adjusted returns. Control variables include: a measure of analyst 
experience, equal to the number of years an analyst has been making 
recommendations on I/B/E/S; an affiliation dummy, equal to one if the analyst is 
employed by a bank that has an under-writing relationship with the covered firm
19; 
an All-Star dummy variable, equal to one if the analyst is listed as an "All-Star" in 
the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine in that year
20; a measure of 
brokerage size, equal to the total number of analysts that work for a given 
analyst’s brokerage house; and fixed effects for recommendation month and 
industry, where indicated. Regressions are run daily, but the coefficients reported 
in Table VI are converted to represent monthly returns (in percent); all standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the recommendation month level.       
  Table VI reports the regression results. Columns 1-3 show that the 
coefficients on the connection dummy variables are positive, significant, and of the 
                                                 
18 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24, 2000). 
19 The list of affiliated analysts is from Ljungqvist at al. (2006). 
20 The list of "all-star" analysts is from Ljungqvist at al. (2007).  
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same order of magnitude as the return results from the portfolios (between 32-48 
basis points per month), again indicating that buy recommendations by analysts 
with school ties earn significantly higher returns than those by analysts without 
such ties. Columns 4-6 report similar results when excess returns are used as the 
dependent variable instead of raw returns, and when industry fixed effects and 
analyst-level controls are included in the regressions.
21        
  Columns 7-9 present the key test of the impact of Reg FD on the school-tie 
return premium. We include a post-Reg FD dummy variable plus an interaction 
term (Conn. Either*post-Reg FD) designed to capture the effect of school ties in 
the post-Reg FD time period.
22 Consistent with the results from our portfolio tests, 
we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is strongly negative and 
significant, while the combined effect (i.e., [Conn. Either*post-
Reg]+[Connected_to_Either]) is small (10bp=-42bp+52bp, from Column 8) and 
insignificant (F-statistic of 1.18), indicating that the school-tie premium is largely 
absent in the post-Reg FD period.  Column 9 reports results from the exact same 
test, but for the subset of analysts that are in the sample both pre- and post-Reg 
FD.  This is to control for a possibility that connected analysts may for some 
reason leave the sample post-Reg FD.  The results are virtually identical on this 
sample of analysts. 
  In summary, all of our findings indicate that Regulation FD had a large 
impact on the school-tie premium that we identify in this paper, suggesting that 
the most likely mechanism driving the superior performance of analysts on their 
school-tied recommendations is direct information transfer.
23 
                                                 
21 Replacing raw returns (Column 1) as the dependent variable with abnormal returns (Column 4) 
results in the constant term becoming insignificant, which indicates that the DGTW characteristic-
adjustment does a good job of capturing most of the unexplained variation in daily returns. 
22 We exclude month fixed effects in these regressions because the model cannot be estimated with a 
post-Reg FD dummy and month fixed effects jointly (as they are collinear). 
23 Note that Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) do not find a large impact of Reg FD on the return 
premium that mutual fund managers earn on their school-connected stocks relative to their non-
connected stocks.  This could be due to a different mechanism at work in the case of mutual fund 
managers.  It could also be due to the fact that equity analysts were under intense scrutiny during 
this time period, not only as a result of Reg FD, but also due to alleged conflicts of interest that led 
to several new policy measures being enacted by the SEC, NASD, and NYSE, and which 
culminated in the Global Settlement of 2003.     
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  Another way to quantify the value of the social networks we isolate in this 
paper to the analyst is to test the extent to which school ties predict the 
probability of that analyst’s becoming an All-Star. As in our prior tests, All-Star 
status is defined as being listed as an "All-Star" in the October issue of 
Institutional Investor magazine in a given year. All-Star status is a sought-after 
designation among analysts, and is typically associated with higher-compensation 
(Stickel (1992)).
24  To assess the predictive power of an analyst’s network, we 
regress a dummy variable for All-Star status in a given year on the average 
number of school ties per analyst per year (Num Conn) plus a host of control 
variables at the analyst- and stock-level. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the analyst was voted as an All-Star analyst for that year.  
We employ a similar set of control variables as in Table VI, with the exception 
that affiliation status is now measured as the average percentage of stocks (over 
the year) in an analyst’s portfolio that have an underwriting relationship with the 
analyst’s brokerage.  Plus we also include a control variable for covered firm size, 
equal to the average size of the firms covered by the analyst in that year. All 
observations are at the analyst-year level; fixed effects at the year and analyst level 
are included where indicated, and all standard errors are adjusted for clustering by 
year. 
  Table VII reports the coefficient estimates from these predictive regressions.  
Columns 1-5 are OLS panel regressions, while Column 6 is a probit regression 
where coefficient estimates are the marginal effects on the probability of being an 
All-Star. Columns 1-3 indicate that the number of school ties (to senior officers, to 
members of the board, or to either) are a strong positive predictor of the likelihood 
of being an All-Star. The coefficient on connections in Column 3 implies that a 2 
standard deviation move in connectedness through school ties more than doubles 
the probability of being an All Star, from 9.2% to 20.1%. Columns 4 and 5 
                                                 
24 Stickel (1992) shows that All-Star analysts also produce more accurate earnings forecasts than 
other analysts, suggesting a link between reputation and performance.  Interestingly, in unreported 
tests we find that the All-Star analysts in our sample do not outperform other analysts on their 
buy/sell recommendations; this result is consistent with prior evidence (see Groysberg et al. (2008), 
footnote 27) that finds no relation between All-Star status and stock returns, except at very short 
windows surrounding recommendation changes.     
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illustrate the effect of Reg FD on this result: we include a post-Reg FD dummy 
variable plus an interaction term (Conn. Either*post-Reg FD) designed to capture 
the predictive impact of the number of school ties on All-Star status in the post-
Reg FD time period.
25 Once again the interaction term is strongly negative, and 
the combined effect ([Conn. Either*post-Reg FD]+[Num. Conn. to Either]) is close 
to zero and insignificant, indicating that the number of school ties have no effect 
on being an All-Star in the post-Reg FD period.  The fact that school ties predict 
All-Star status only before the imposition of Reg FD further highlights the value of 
social networks precisely during those times when selective disclosure is least 
inhibited. 
  We also construct an out-of-sample test of the impact of Reg FD by 
replicating our results in the United Kingdom, where there was no such regulation 
enacted at this time. Again we form buy-sell portfolios of linked and non-linked 
recommendations, but we now restrict our analysis to UK-listed stocks for which 
we have analyst recommendations on I/B/E/S and available educational 
background information on both the analyst and the senior officers of the firm.
26  
Table VIII shows that over the entire sample period, we again find a large school-
tie return premium on buy recommendations for UK-listed stocks: a long-short 
portfolio that purchases linked buy recommendations and shorts non-linked buy 
recommendations earns 187 basis points per month (t=2.79) in raw returns, and 
167 basis points per month (t=2.20) in abnormal returns.  Again we find no 
significant school-tie premium on sell recommendations.  However, unlike in the 
US, we see no significant difference in the school-tie premium on buy 
recommendations between the pre- and post-Reg FD time periods.
27 The point 
                                                 
25 Again we do not include year fixed effects in these specifications, because the model cannot be 
estimated with year fixed effects and the post Reg FD dummy variable included together.  We do 
include analyst fixed effects in Columns 5 and 6. 
26 Analogous to our US sample, we collect educational data on I/B/E/S analysts issuing 
recommendations on stocks traded in the UK, as defined by the I/B/E/S country exchange code. 
We hand matched firms from the Boardex sample to I/B/E/S using company names.  Daily returns 
(in local currency) are from Factset. Market equity and book equity are from Compustat Global. 
Note that the coverage of our sample is sparse for non-US data: By requiring educational 
information on I/B/E/S analysts covering UK stocks, we limit our sample to an average of 
approximately 30 analysts, 77 stocks, and 175 recommendations per year over the 1993-2006 time 
period. 
27 For brevity we only report results for links to senior management, and for raw returns (in Panel  
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estimates of the school-tie premium are actually slightly higher (although not 
significantly) in the post Reg FD time period. This gives confirming evidence that 
the Reg FD effect we find in the main (US) sample is in fact driven completely by 
this new regulation against selective disclosure. In the absence of regulatory 
change, school ties continue to confer significant benefits to analysts.  
  In order to better understand the type of information being transferred 
across the networks, we also examine the relative forecast accuracy of analysts with 
school ties, under the hypothesis that the information advantage gained by linked 
analysts is specifically related to information that would allow an analyst to better 
predict earnings per share numbers reported by firms. In unreported results, we 
find no significant differences in relative forecast accuracy (or relative forecast 
optimism) between the forecasts of analysts with school ties and those without.
28 
These results suggest that the school-tie return premium we document in Section 
III is unlikely to relate to information obtained about future earnings per share 
numbers. In unreported tests we also look at the propensity of buys among school 
tied and non tied firms that later announce a merger, as well as merger-related-
news return decompositions, and find little difference, suggesting that the passing 
of merger-related information is unlikely to fully explain our findings.  
 
V.  Robustness 
In this section we perform a variety of robustness checks.  First we compute 
event-time cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for our various categories of stock 
recommendations. Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted 
returns. Table IX reports event-time CARs for upgrades and downgrades only, 
broken down by school ties and time period. These event-time results, which we 
                                                                                                                                                    
B).  Results are very similar for the full set of specifications used earlier. 
28 Following Malloy (2005) and Clement (1999) and using 1- and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts 
drawn from the I/B/E/S Detail File, we run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of de-
meaned absolute forecast error (DAFE), proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFE), and 
relative optimism (OPT) on a variety of analyst characteristics plus a dummy variable equal to one 
if the analyst is linked to the board of directors or a senior officer of the firm being covered.   
Although the sign on the dummy variables in the DAFE and PMAFE regressions is consistently 
negative (indicating that linked analysts are more accurate), the coefficients are generally 
insignificant.  These results are available on request.    
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also plot in Figures 2 to 4 are consistent with the findings from our calendar time 
portfolio tests. Over the full sample period, upgrades by analysts with school ties 
earn a premium of 35 basis points over other upgrades in the 2 days around the 
event, and a premium of almost 400 basis points over the calendar year after the 
recommendation change. In the pre-Reg FD period, this premium increases to over 
700 basis points over the calendar year after the change. Figures 2 and 3 show that 
much of the upgrade return premium associated with school ties is concentrated 
between 60 and 250 days after the recommendation, suggesting that whatever 
information these linked analysts obtain does not get revealed into prices until 
several months after the recommendation change.  
Table IX and Figures 2 to 4 also paint a consistent picture of the differential 
impact of sell recommendations by our two types of analysts. As with the calendar 
time portfolio tests, our event time results indicate that the performance of sell 
recommendations by linked analysts is not significantly different from our control 
sample of non-linked sell recommendations. 
Table X presents a series of robustness checks designed to ensure that our 
results are not driven by particular types of analyst, firms, or academic 
institutions. In general, our results are robust to a variety of breakdowns; further, 
our findings are typically concentrated in precisely those areas where one might 
expect information asymmetry to be most pronounced, and hence the return 
premium associated with school ties to be largest. For example, Panel A of Table 
X shows that the long-short portfolio return of linked buy recommendations minus 
non-linked buy recommendations earns 89 basis points per month in a subsample 
of small stocks (below the NYSE median market capitalization) over the full 
sample period, and 144 basis points per month in the pre-Reg FD period. 
Panel B presents a series of breakdowns by type of analyst.  First we separate 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. The long-short portfolio return of linked buy 
recommendations minus non-linked buy recommendations of non affiliated analysts 
earns 44 basis points per month over the entire sample, 67 basis points per month 
in the pre-Reg FD period and an insignificant 13 basis points post reg-FD. Returns 
for affiliated analysts are similar in magnitude but insignificant. Splitting the  
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sample by the size of the brokerage house, the connection premium appears 
concentrated in those analysts at the larger brokerage houses.  
Panel C shows that our results are not driven by a particular type of 
academic institution. Although the school-tie premium is larger among Ivy League 
institutions (57 basis points per month compared to 36 basis points for Non-Ivy 
League institutions, over the full sample period), it is large and significant for both 
sets of schools. School adjusted returns, defined as the raw return minus the 
average return of a portfolio of all firms where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO 
or Chairman) or a board member received a degree from the same institution, are 
similar to our full sample results in Table III, indicating that individual school 
effects do not drive our results. Finally, as with our earlier findings, the results for 
sell recommendations are mixed, and generally insignificant.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  In this paper we investigate information dissemination in security markets. 
We use the recommendations of sell-side equity analysts as a laboratory to study 
the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information 
about firms. In particular, we test the hypothesis that analysts’ school ties to 
senior corporate officers impart comparative information advantages in the 
production of analyst research. Our main result is that equity analysts outperform 
on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to that 
company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations of 
analysts with school ties and going short the buy recommendations of analysts 
without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year in the full sample.   
  This result suggests that analysts’ social networks facilitate the direct 
transfer of information, or alternatively that these networks simply allow analysts 
to better assess managerial quality. In order to distinguish between these two 
hypotheses, we exploit a regulation introduced during our sample period explicitly 
aimed at blocking the former mechanism of selective information transfer: 
Regulation FD, instated by the SEC in October of 2000.  We find a large effect of  
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the law: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties is 8.16% per year, while 
post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant. A similar test in 
the UK, which did not experience a change in the disclosure environment at this 
time, reveals a large and significant school-tie premium for buy recommendations 
over the entire sample period, both pre- and post-2000.   
  Taken together, our findings suggest that agents in financial markets can 
gain informational advantages through their social networks.  In addition, laws 
designed to block these types of information pathways can be effective in curbing 
selective disclosure. The magnitude of our results indicates that informal 
information networks are an important, yet under-emphasized channel through 
which private information gets revealed into prices. Identifying the types of 
information transferred across social networks and the extent to which social 
networks are important in other information environments can provide us with a 
richer understanding of information flow, and price evolution, in security markets.  
Sell-Side School Ties — Page 25 
 
References 
Agrawal, Anup, Sahiba Chadha and Mark A. Chen, 2006, Who is afraid of 
  Reg FD? The behavior and performance of sell-side analysts following 
  the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules, Journal of Business 79, 2811-2834.  
 
Barber, Brad, Reuven Lehavy, and Brett Trueman, 2005, Comparing the stock 
recommendation performance of investment banks and independent research 
firms, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Barber, Brad, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols, and Brett Trueman, 2001, Can 
investors profit from the prophets? Security analyst recommendations and 
stock returns, Journal of Finance 56, 531-564.  
Barber, Brad, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols, and Brett Trueman, 2003, 
Reassessing the returns to analysts’ stock recommendations, Financial 
Analysts Journal 59, 88-96.  
Barber, Brad, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols, and Brett Trueman, 2005, 
Buys, holds, and sells: The distribution of investment banks’ stock ratings 
and the implications for the profitability of analysts’ recommendations, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming. 
Chevalier, Judith, and Glenn Ellison, 1999, Career concerns of mutual fund 
managers, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 389-432. 
Cohen, Lauren, Andrea Frazzini, and Christopher J. Malloy, 2007, The small world 
of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns, Working paper, 
Yale University. 
Conyon, Martin J., and Mark R. Muldoon, 2006, The small world of corporate 
boards, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 33, 1321-1343.  
Davis, Gerald F., 1991, Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill 
through the inter-corporate network, Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 
583-613. 
Faccio, Mara, 2006, Politically connected firms, American Economic Review 96, 
369-386. 
Fisman, David, Ray Fisman, Julia Galef, and Rakesh Khurana, 2006, Estimating 
the value of connections to Vice-President Cheney, Working paper, Columbia 
University. 
Gintschel, Andreas and Stanimir Markov, 2004, The effectiveness of Regulation 
FD, Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, 293-314. 
Gleason, Cristi A., and Charles M. C. Lee, 2003, Analyst forecast revisions and  
Sell-Side School Ties — Page 26 
 
market price discovery, The Accounting Review 78, 193-225. 
Groysberg, Boris, Paul Healy, Craig Chapman, Devin Shanthikumar, and Yang 
Gui (2007), Do buy-side analysts out-perform the sell-side?, Working paper, 
Harvard University. 
Groysberg, Boris, Paul Healy, and David Maber (2008), What drives (and does not 
drive) financial analyst compensation?, Working paper, Harvard University. 
Hallock, K. F., 1997, Reciprocally interlocking board of directors and executive 
compensation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 331-344. 
Haunschild, Pamela R., 1993, Interorganizational imitation: The impact of 
interlocks on corporate acquisition activity, Administrative Science Quarterly 
38, 564-592. 
Holmström, Bengt, 1999, Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective, 
Review of Economic Studies 66, 169-182. 
Hong, Harrison, and Jeffrey D. Kubik, 2003, Analyzing the analysts: Career 
concerns and biased forecasts, Journal of Finance 58, 313-351. 
Hong, Harrison, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Amit Solomon, 2000, Security analysts’ 
career concerns and herding of earnings forecasts, RAND Journal of 
Economics 31, 121-144. 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, Joonghyuk Kim, Susan D. Krische, and Charles M. C. 
Lee, 2004, Analyzing the analysts: When do recommendations add value?, 
Journal of Finance 59, 1083-1124. 
Khurana, Rakesh, 2002, Searching for a corporate savior: The irrational quest for 
charismatic CEOs, Princeton University Press. 
Lamont, Owen, 2002, Macroeconomic forecasts and microeconomic forecasters, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48, 265-280. 
Larcker, David F., Scott A. Richardson, Andrew J. Seary, and Irem Tuna, 2005, 
Back door links between directors and executive compensation, Working 
paper, University of Pennsylvania.  
Lin, Hsiou-wei and Maureen F. McNichols, 1998, Underwriting relationships, 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 25, 101-127. 
Lin, Hsiou-wei, Maureen F. McNichols, and Patricia O’Brien, 2005, Analyst 
impartiality and investment banking relationships, Journal of Accounting 
Research 43, 623-650.  
Sell-Side School Ties — Page 27 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander,  F. Marston and W.J. Wilhelm, 2006, Competing for 
Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst 
Recommendations, journal of Finance 61, 301-340.  
Ljungqvist, Alexander, F. Marston and W.J. Wilhelm, 2007, Scaling the Hierarchy: 
How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management 
Appointments, Review of Financial Studies forthcoming. 
Malloy, Christopher J., 2005, The geography of equity analysis, Journal of Finance 
60, 719-755. 
Michaely, Roni, and Kent L. Womack, 1999, Conflict of interest and the credibility 
of underwriter analyst recommendations, Review of Financial Studies 12, 
653-686. 
Michaely, Roni, and Kent L. Womack, 2007, What are analysts really good at?, 
Working paper, Cornell University. 
Mikhail, Michael B., Beverly R. Walther, and Richard H. Willis, 1999, Does 
forecast accuracy matter to security analysts?, Accounting Review 74, 185-
200. 
Mizruchi, Mark S., 1982, The American Corporate Network, 1904-1974, Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications. 
Mizruchi, Mark S., 1992, The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Inter-firm 
Relations and Their Consequences, Harvard University Press.  
Mohanran, Partha and Shyam V. Sunder, 2006, How has Regulation FD affected 
the operations of financial analysts?, Contemporary Accounting Research 23, 
491-525. 
Scharfstein, David S., and Jeremy C. Stein, 1990, Herd behavior and investment, 
American Economic Review 80, 465-479. 
Stickel, Scott E., 1991, Common stock returns surrounding earnings forecast 
 revisions:  more  puzzling evidence. The Accounting Review, 66, 402- 416. 
 
Stickel, Scott E., 1992, Reputation and performance among security analysts, 
Journal of Finance 47, 1811-1836. 
Useem, Michael, 1984, The Inner Circle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Womack, Kent, 1996, Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment 
value?. Journal of Finance 51, 137-167. 
 Table I: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample of sell side analysts and their covered stocks between 
1993 and 2006. The sample of analysts includes all sell side analysts from the merged 
CRSP/IBES/BOARDEX issuing recommendations on US stocks between 1993 and 2006. The sample of 
stocks includes the stocks from the merged CRSP/IBES/BOARDEX data with non missing information 
on the educational background of members of the board of directors and senior officers of the firm (CEO, 
CFO or Chairman).  Panel A reports the data coverage as a fraction of the total number of IBES 
analysts, the total number of recommendations (%Reccs) and total market value of covered stocks 
(%ME). Panel B reports pooled means. Analyst coverage is the # of analysts providing recommendations 
for a given stock in the prior 12 months; # of stocks is the number of stocks for a given analyst with a 
valid recommendation in the prior 12 months.  
Panel A: coverage of IBES/CRSP universe 
year  # analysts #stocks # Reccs % analysts % stocks % ME %   Reccs
1993 153 650 1,066 0.14 0.22 0.52 0.10
1994 243 883 2,468 0.15 0.25 0.54 0.12
1995 283 1,022 2,701 0.16 0.28 0.56 0.12
1996 349 1,166 2,785 0.17 0.28 0.55 0.13
1997 402 1,396 3,339 0.17 0.33 0.66 0.15
1998 516 1,574 4,104 0.19 0.37 0.72 0.16
1999 602 1,737 4,897 0.21 0.44 0.75 0.19
2000 645 1,915 5,562 0.23 0.52 0.84 0.24
2001 682 1,905 6,397 0.25 0.61 0.86 0.28
2002 756 2,203 10,218 0.27 0.68 0.90 0.30
2003 813 2,167 8,829 0.30 0.71 0.90 0.33
2004 958 2,340 9,081 0.33 0.73 0.86 0.36
2005 1,078 2,474 9,374 0.36 0.76 0.88 0.40
2006 971 2,441 9,623 0.33 0.74 0.88 0.38
Average 604 1,705 5,746 0.23 0.49 0.74 0.23
Panel B: pooled observations   mean median min max std
Analysts coverage  4.97 4.00 1.00 32.00 3.84
# firms per analysts  13.87 12.00 1.00 122.00 10.12
Size percentile  0.78 0.84 0.01 1.00 0.20
Book-to-market percentile  0.37 0.33 0.01 1.00 0.25
12-month return percentile  0.52 0.53 0.01 1.00 0.29
# of schools per year  766 766 707 796 28
# of board members per year  8,388  8,160  2,355  14,389           4,176 
# of senior officers per year  3,769 3,963 1,183 5,832          1,624Table II: Links Between Sell Side Analysts and Firm’s Management by Academic Institution 
This table shows summary statistics of the ties among sell side analysts and US traded firms based on educational backgrounds between 1993 and 
2006. The sample of analysts includes all sell side analysts from the merged CRSP/IBES/BOARDEX issuing recommendations on US stocks between 
1993 and 2006. The sample of stocks includes the stocks from the merged CRSP/IBES/BOARDEX data with non missing information on the 
educational background of members of the board of directors and senior officers of the firm (CEO, CFO or Chairman). In Panel A we classify a stock 
as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a senior officer (defined as either the CEO, CFO or Chairman of 
board). In panel B we classify a stock as having educational ties to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a member of the board of 
directors. The table reports the distribution of the total number of educational links between 1993 and 2006 by academic institution.  
  Panel A: Analyst tied to firm’s senior officers    Panel B: Analyst tied to board of directors 
Rank  Academic institution  # of ties  % of total   Rank  Academic institution  # of ties  % of total
1  Harvard University  941  18.53    1  Harvard University  2,300  18.22 
2  University of Pennsylvania  522  10.28    2  Columbia University  1,139  9.02 
3  New York University  350  6.89    3  University of Pennsylvania 1,065  8.44 
4  Stanford University  311  6.12    4  New York University  1,006  7.97 
5  Columbia University  288  5.67    5  Yale University  717  5.68 
6  Cornell University  173  3.41    6  Stanford University  597  4.73 
7 M.I.T.  168 3.31    7  M.I.T.  491  3.89 
8  Yale University  155  3.05    8  Cornell University  437  3.46 
9  University of Chicago  140  2.76    9  UC Berkeley  347  2.75 
10  UT Austin  137  2.7    10  University of Chicago  317  2.51 
Others   1,893  37.28    Others    4,205  33.32 
Ivy League   2,220  43.72    Ivy League    6,122  48.51 
All   5,078  100    All    12,621 100 
 Table III: Returns to School Ties, 1993—2006  
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution 
as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio 
consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) 
or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, 
initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from 
coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve 
months, it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each 
recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios 
by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these 
recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the 
exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average 
returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on 
a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly 
percent. L/S is the average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. t-
statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
Panel A: Buy recommendations  Buy recommendations (level)  Only upgrades 
  Raw returns  Abnormal returns    Raw returns  Abnormal returns
No shared educational background  1.04  0.04   1.35  0.31  
  (1.97)     (0.43)     (2.81)     (3.14)   
Linked recommendations  L/S L/S  L/S L/S
Analyst linked to senior Management  1.49 0.45 0.44 0.40  1.70 0.35 0.62 0.31
or board of directors  (2.91) (3.87)   (3.24) (4.63)   (3.35) (2.32)   (3.49) (2.30) 
Analyst  linked to senior management  1.59 0.55 0.51 0.47  1.65 0.29 0.61 0.30
  (3.04) (3.75)   (3.19) (3.96)   (3.16) (1.71)   (2.86) (1.93) 
Analyst linked to board of directors  1.47 0.43 0.45 0.41  1.72 0.37 0.62 0.31
  (2.91) (3.16)   (3.20) (4.30)   (3.36) (2.16)   (3.18) (2.02) 
 
 
 Table III: Returns to School Ties, 1993—2006 (continued) 
Panel B: Sell recommendations  Sell recommendations (level)  Only downgrades 
  Raw returns  Abnormal returns    Raw returns  Abnormal returns
No shared educational background  1.03  -0.17    1.06  -0.21   
  (1.83)     -(1.31)     (1.81)     -(1.45)   
Linked recommendations  L/S L/S  L/S L/S
Analyst linked to senior Management  1.08 0.05 0.05 0.22  1.09 0.03 0.05 0.26
or board of directors  (2.08) (0.46)   (0.37) (2.21)   (2.05) (0.22)   (0.34) (1.82) 
Analyst  linked to senior management  1.10 0.07 0.10 0.27  1.26 0.20 0.25 0.46
  (2.05) (0.46)   (0.61) (1.92)   (2.20) (0.85)   (1.01) (1.94) 
Analyst linked to board of directors  1.12 0.09 0.10 0.27  1.07 0.02 0.03 0.24
  (2.18) (0.77)   (0.76) (2.45)   (2.04) (0.09)   (0.21) (1.69) 
  Table IV: Buy Recommendations, Returns to School Ties Pre and Post- REG FD  
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution 
as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio 
consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) 
or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, 
initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from 
coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve 
months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each 
recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios 
by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these 
recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the 
exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average 
returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on 
a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly 
percent.  L/S is average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. Pre- and 
Post REG FD indicates returns for recommendations issued prior and subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD on October 23, 2000. t-statistics 
are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A: Raw returns  Pre REG FD Post REG FD Difference Only Upgrades
No shared educational background  1.25      0.76      0.50    Pre Post Diff
  (1.93)     (0.87)     (0.46)      REG  FD  REG  FD   
Linked recommendations  L/S L/S L/S L/S L/S L/S
Analyst linked to senior   1.94 0.68 0.90 0.14 1.04 0.55 0.53 0.11 0.43
Management or board of directors  (3.12) (4.36)    (1.05) (0.84)    (1.01) (2.38)    (2.30)  (0.64)  (1.41) 
Analyst  linked to senior   2.03 0.78 1.02 0.26 1.01 0.51 0.64 -0.14 0.80
Management  (3.12) (3.50)    (1.19) (1.51)    (0.95) (1.73)    (2.44)  -(0.68)  (2.24) 
Analyst linked to board of   1.94 0.69 0.84 0.09 1.10 0.60 0.56 0.12 0.45
Directors  (3.17) (3.71)    (1.00) (0.45)    (1.08) (2.24)    (2.17)  (0.58)  (1.30) 
 
 Table IV: Buy Recommendations, Returns to School Ties Pre and Post- REG FD (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns  Pre REG FD Post REG FD Difference Only upgrades
No shared educational background  0.27 -0.26 0.53 Pre Post Diff
  (2.09)     -(2.08)     (2.89)     REG  FD  REG  FD   
Linked recommendations  L/S L/S L/S L/S L/S L/S
Analyst linked to senior   0.82 0.55 -0.05 0.21 0.87 0.34 0.50 0.08 0.42
Management or board of directors  (4.38) (4.62)    -(0.27) (1.71)    (3.26) (1.94)    (2.36)  (0.50)  (1.54) 
Analyst  linked to senior   0.95 0.67 -0.07 0.19 1.01 0.48 0.68 -0.19 0.91
Management  (4.14) (3.97)    -(0.35) (1.29)    (3.26) (2.04)    (3.10)  -(0.83)  (2.75) 
Analyst linked to board of   0.84 0.57 -0.06 0.20 0.91 0.37 0.50 0.07 0.42



















 Table V: Sell Recommendations, Returns to School Ties Pre- and Post- REG FD  
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution 
as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio 
consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) 
or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, 
initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from 
coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve 
months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each 
recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios 
by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these 
recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the 
exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average 
returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on 
a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly 
percent.  L/S is average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. Pre- and 
Post REG FD indicates returns for recommendations issued prior and subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD on October 23, 2000. t-statistics 
are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A: Raw returns  Pre REG FD Post REG FD Difference Only Downgrades
No shared educational background  0.92 1.18 -0.26 Pre Post Diff
  (1.57)     (1.12)     -(0.23)     REG  FD  REG  FD   
Linked recommendations  L/S L/S L/S L/S L/S L/S
Analyst linked to senior   1.07 0.16 1.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.25 0.11 -0.06 0.17
Management or board of directors  (1.87)  (1.12)   (1.16)  -(0.53)  -(0.01) (1.13)    (0.47)  -(0.29)  (0.52) 
Analyst  linked to senior   1.20 0.29 0.97 -0.21 0.24 0.50 0.53 -0.22 0.74
Management  (1.99)  (1.31)   (1.00)  -(1.08)   (0.22) (1.65)    (1.39)  -(0.90)  (1.54) 
Analyst linked to board of   1.13 0.21 1.10 -0.08 0.03 0.29 0.07 -0.05 0.12
Directors  (1.97)  (1.52)   (1.20)  -(0.40)   (0.03) (1.25)    (0.30)  -(0.23)  (0.37) 
 
 Table V: Sell Recommendations, Returns to School Ties Pre- and Post- REG FD (continued) 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns  Pre REG FD Post REG FD   Difference Only Downgrades
No shared educational background  -0.20 -0.13   -0.08 Pre Post Diff
  -(1.79)     -(0.48)     -(0.30)     REG  FD  REG 
FD 
 
Linked recommendations  L/S L/S   L/S L/S L/S L/S
Analyst linked to senior   0.05 0.25 0.04 0.17  0.01 0.09 0.31 0.21 0.09
Management or board of directors  (0.32) (1.95)    (0.21) (1.11)    (0.05) (0.45)    (1.40)  (1.20)  (0.32) 
Analyst  linked to senior   0.23 0.43 -0.07 0.05  0.30 0.38 0.73 0.11 0.62
Management  (1.10) (2.25)   -(0.28) (0.27)    (0.93) (1.34)    (1.94)  (0.45)  (1.31) 
Analyst linked to board of   0.13 0.34 0.05 0.17  0.08 0.16 0.26 0.22 0.05
Directors  (0.76) (2.35)    (0.27) (1.04)    (0.33) (0.74)    (1.28)  (1.09)  (0.16) 
 Table VI: School Tie regressions 
This table reports panel regressions of returns on buy recommendations of analysts. The dependent variables are 
either returns (Ret) or Abnormal returns (Xeret), where indicated.  Xeret are defined as size-BM-momentum 
adjusted returns as in Daniel et. al (1997). The regressions were run daily, but coefficients have been adjusted 
to represent monthly returns (abnormal returns) in percent. The first 3 variables are categorical variables of 
whether or not the analyst is connected in an education network to the given firm on which she is making a 
recommendation: (i) Connected to Either indicates the analyst is connected to either the senior officers or board 
of directors, (ii) Connected to Mgmt indicates the analyst is connected to the senior officers, and (iii) Connected 
to Board indicates the analyst is connected to the board of directors.  Post Reg-FD is a categorical variable 
equal to 1 for all recommendations made after Regulation FD came into effect (Oct 23, 2000), and 0 for all 
recommendations made before. Conn. Either*Post Reg-FD is the interaction term between Connected to Either 
and  Post Reg-FD.  Analyst Experience is equal to the number of years the analyst has been making 
recommendations recorded in I/B/E/S. Affiliation is a categorical variable that measures whether or not the 
given firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst's brokerage. All Star is a categorical variable equal 
to 1 if the investor was voted an all star analyst in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the 
given year. Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst's brokerage house.  
Column 9 includes only those analysts that are in the sample both pre- and post-Reg FD.  Fixed effects for 
month (Month), analyst (Analyst), and industry (Indus) using the Fama-French industry definitions, are 
included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the month level, and t-stats using 
these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical 
significance is indicated in bold. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Ret Ret Ret Xeret Xeret Xeret Xeret  Xeret Xeret
Connected to Either  0.36   0.30 0.21 0.30 0.50  0.52 0.51
  (5.16)      (4.54) (2.38) (3.56) (4.57) (3.76) (3.39) 
Connected to Mgmt    0.48         
    (4.23)         
Connected to Board     0.32       
     (4.09)        
Conn. Either*         -0.34 -0.42 -0.50
Post-RegFD         (2.46) (2.55) (2.67) 
Post Reg-FD         -0.42 -0.46 -0.55
         (4.33) (3.92) (4.09) 
Analyst Experience      -0.01 0.04  0.04 0.07
       (0.57) (2.59)    (2.94) (3.14) 
Affiliation     -0.41 -0.42  -0.36 -0.33
       (2.21) (2.43)    (2.04) (1.75) 
All Star      -0.22 -0.16   -0.20 -0.16
       (1.26) (1.46)    (2.01) (1.42) 
Brokerage Size      -0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
       (2.12) (0.71)    (1.35) (0.66) 
Constant  1.14 1.18 1.16 0.00 0.48 0.94 0.24  0.34 0.23
  (87.95) (163.74) (99.02)  (0.37)  (2.14) (1.94) (3.04) (1.52) (0.80) 
Fixed Effect  Month  Month  Month Month Month Month  
Fixed Effect         Analyst Indus Indus Indus IndusTable VII: All-Star Status and School Ties 
This table reports the effect of being connected on All-Star status. The dependent variable in each regression is a 
categorical variable for All Star status, which is equal to 1 if the analyst was voted an all star analyst in the 
October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the given year. All observations are thus at the analyst-year 
level. The first 4 variables are variables that measure the average connectedness of an analyst to the portfolio of 
firms that she covers. (i) Num. Conn. to Both indicates the number of firms the analyst covers to whom he is 
connected to both the senior officers or board of directors, (ii) Num. Conn. to Mgmt indicates the number of 
firms the analyst covers to whom he is connected to the senior officers, (iii) Num. Conn. to Board indicates the 
number of firms the analyst covers to whom he is connected to the board of directors, and (iv) Num. Conn. to 
Either indicates the number of firms the analyst covers to whom he is connected to either the senior officers or 
board of directors. Post Reg-FD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for years after Regulation FD came into 
effect (2000), and 0 for all years before. Conn. Both*Post Reg-FD is the interaction term between Connections to 
Both and Post Reg-FD. Covered Firm Size is the average size of firm covered by the given analyst in the given 
year. Analyst Experience is equal to the number of years the analyst has been making recommendations recorded 
in I/B/E/S. Affiliation is the average percentage of stocks in an analyst's portfolio that have an underwriting 
relationship with the analyst's brokerage. Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given 
analyst's brokerage house. Fixed effects at the year (Year) and analyst (Analyst) level are included where 
indicated. Columns 1-5 are OLS panel regressions, while Column 6 is a probit regression, where coefficient 
estimates shown are the marginal effects on the probability of being an All Star. All standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering by year, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6)
         Probit
Num. Conn. to Board  0.033     
  (4.54)    
Num. Conn. to Mgmt    0.061    
    (5.42)    
Num. Conn. to Either     0.030 0.032 0.031   0.013
    (4.58) (6.00) (5.29)    (10.84) 
Conn Both*      -0.025 -0.025   -0.008
Post Reg-FD    (3.92) (3.93)    (5.36) 
Post-RegFD      0.014 0.037   -0.089
    (1.06) (2.27)    (5.10) 
Covered Firm Size        -0.003   0.015
    (0.55)   (7.38) 
Brokerage Size       0.000   0.001
    (2.12)   (11.99) 
Affiliation       0.112   0.088
    (2.06)   (5.67) 
Analyst Experience       -0.004   0.009
    (0.65)   (4.56) 
Constant  0.060 0.067 0.057 0.064 0.056   
  (8.97) (15.18) (7.72) (10.81) (1.53)   
Fixed Effect  Year  Year Year   
Fixed Effect    Analyst Analyst   Table VIII: Returns to School Ties, UK Evidence, 1993—2006 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns (in local currency). We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended 
the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a 
BUY portfolio consisting to all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy 
(IBES code = 2) or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous 
recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or 
dropped from coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated 
within twelve months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio 
each recommended stocks is hold until is either downgraded, dropped from coverage or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted 
portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code, reversing the ranking from 1 (strong 
sell) to 5 (strong buy). The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that that the original IBES recommendation code from 
5 (strong sell) to 1 (strong buy) is used as portfolio weight. We report average returns and DGTW-adjusted returns in the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW 
characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all I/B/E/S firms traded in the UK in the 
same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly percent. L/S is average return of a zero cost 
portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. Pre- and post REG FD indicates returns for 
recommendations issued prior and subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD in the US on October 23, 2000. t-statistics are shown below the 
coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A:  All Sample 1993-2006  Buy recommendations Sell recommendations
  Raw returns Abnormal returns  Raw returns Abnormal returns 
No shared educational background  0.71 -0.13   0.45 -0.24  
  (1.41) L/S      -(0.51) L/S      (0.78) L/S   -(0.91) L/S 
Analyst  linked to senior   2.58 1.87 1.54 1.67  -0.34 -0.79 0.02 0.26 
Management  (3.11) (2.79)      (2.09) (2.20)     -(0.39)  -(1.06)    (0.04) (0.46) 
Panel B: Pre and Post- REG FD  Pre REG FD  Post REG FD  Difference    Pre REG FD  Post REG FD  Difference 
No shared educational background 0.54 0.91 0.37   0.38 0.57 0.19 0.38 
  (0.71) L/S  (1.47)  L/S (0.36) L/S    (0.47) L/S  (0.80)  L/S (0.16)  (0.47) 
Analyst  linked to senior   2.32 1.78 2.90 1.99 0.58 0.21 -0.48 -0.86 -0.08 -0.65 0.41 0.21 
management  (1.98) (2.11) (2.48)  (1.82)  (0.34) (0.15)   -(0.52) -(1.18) -(0.04)  -(0.40)  (0.23)  (0.14) Table IX: Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns (upgrades/downgrades only) 
This table shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same 
institution as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY 
portfolio consisting to all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded 
with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as 
DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-
adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in percent, standard errors are clustered by calendar date, and t-statistics are shown 
below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. Panel B and panel C reports results prior and subsequent to the 
introduction of Regulation FD on October 23, 2000, respectively.  
 Buy recommendation   Sell recommendations
CAR[t,t+k] [0,  1] [2,125] [2,250] [0,250] [0, 1] [2,125] [2,250] [0,250]
Panel A: full sample 
No shared educational background  2.49 1.56 2.02 4.51 -2.37 -1.11 -1.13 -3.50
  (35.40) (4.08) (3.19) (7.07)    -(23.39)  -(2.88)  -(1.89)  -(5.77) 
Analyst linked to senior   2.83 2.62 3.99 8.47 -2.65 0.12 1.01 -1.65
Management or board of directors  (20.92) (3.54) (3.23) (6.82)    -(14.44) (0.17) (0.96)  -(1.55) 
Difference  0.35 1.06 1.96 3.96 - 0 . 2 81 . 2 32 . 1 41 . 8 6
  (2.29) (1.27) (1.41) (2.84)    -(1.34) (1.57) (1.77) (1.52) 
Panel B: pre REG FD 
No shared educational background  1.95 3.85 5.36 7.31 -2.33 -1.04 -1.93 -4.26
  (17.84) (5.29) (4.52) (6.14)    -(15.52)  -(1.46)  -(1.70)  -(3.71) 
Analyst linked to senior   2.33 5.16 12.09 14.53 -2.38 -0.40 2.27 -0.11
Management or board of directors  (11.58) (4.10) (5.68) (6.80)    -(8.89)  -(0.32) (1.15)  -(0.05) 
Difference 0.38 1.31 6.73 7.22 - 0 . 0 50 . 6 44 . 2 04 . 1 6
  (1.66) (1.98) (2.77) (2.95)    -(0.15) (0.45) (1.84) (1.81) 
Panel A: post RED FD 
No shared educational background  2.76 0.37 0.24 3.00 -2.39 -1.14 -0.81 -3.20
  (30.70) (0.83) (0.33) (4.06)    -(18.54)  -(2.46)  -(1.15)  -(4.48) 
Analyst linked to senior   3.13 1.08 -0.89 4.48 -2.77 0.32 0.53 -2.24
Management or board of directors  (17.37) (1.19)  -(0.60) (3.00)    -(11.70) (0.40) (0.43)  -(1.80) 
Difference 0.38 0.71 -1.14 1.48 -0.38 1.46 1.34 0.96
  (1.88) (0.70)  -(0.69) (0.89)    -(1.41) (1.56) (0.95) (0.67) Table X: Robustness Checks 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. We report average the DGTW-adjusted return of a zero cost portfolio that 
holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks between 1993 to 2006. In this table links are 
defined as recommendations by an analyst who is linked either to the firm’s senior management or to the firm's board of 
directors. "Pre" and "Post" REG FD refers to the introduction of Regulation FD on October 23, 2000. IPO are stocks with less 
than 24 months from the IPO date. Panel A reports results broken down by stock characteristic. "IPO"s are stocks that are less 
than 24 months removed from the IPO date. Panel B reports results broken down by analyst characteristics. "Affiliated" 
analysts belong to a bank that has an under-writing relationship with the covered firm. Brokerage houses are classified as "large" 
or "small" based on the median number or analysts issuing recommendations in the current calendar year. Panel C reports 
results by institutions. School adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the average return of a portfolio of all firms 
where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member received a degree from the same institution. “Top 5 
most connected” are academic institutions, ranked by the total number of links in table II over the period 1990 to 2006. t-
statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
BUY recommendations, linked recommendations minus not linked












Panel A1: Stocks characteristics 
Large cap stocks  0.45 0.62 0.23 Small cap stocks 0.89 1.44 0.18
above NYSE median  (3.69)  (3.31)  (1.69)    above NYSE median  (3.22)  (3.71)  (0.47) 
IPO  0.87 0.98 0.75 Not IPO 0.28 0.49 0.02
<24 months from IPO  (2.62)  (2.11)  (1.56)    >24 months from IPO   (3.11)  (3.76)  (0.15) 
High analysts coverage  0.34 0.48 0.14 Low analysts coverage 0.45 0.67 0.17
above NYSE median  (3.10)  (3.21)  (0.95)    Below  NYSE median  (3.78)  (3.99)  (1.04) 
Panel B1: analysts characteristics 
Affiliated  0.62 0.82 -0.04 Non affiliated 0.44 0.67 0.13
  (1.42) (1.70) -(0.05)  (3.67) (4.14)  (0.79) 
Large brokerage firm  0.46   0.69  0.16  Small brokerage firm -0.39 0.03  -0.94
  (3.92) (4.31)  (0.97)  -(0.66) (0.04)  -(1.17) 
Panel C1: institutions characteristics 
Ivy league  0.57 0.98 0.03 Not ivy league 0.36 0.49 0.20
  (3.55) (4.65)  (0.12)     (3.02) (2.95)  (1.15) 
Top 5 most linked  0.38 0.67 -0.01 Not Top 5 most linked 0.52 0.75 0.23
  (2.16) (2.95) -(0.04)     (4.12) (4.16)  (1.35) 
School adjusted returns  0.38 0.53 0.20 School adjusted returns  0.42 0.64 0.16











 Table X: Robustness Checks (continued) 
 
SELL  recommendations, linked recommendations minus not linked












Panel A2: Stocks characteristics 
Large cap stocks  0.17 0.30 0.02 Small cap stocks 0.05 -0.02 0.15
above NYSE median  (1.73) (1.65)  (0.11)    above NYSE median (0.17) -(0.04) (0.47) 
IPO  -0.30 -0.14 -0.48 Not IPO 0.10 0.20 -0.04
<24 months from IPO  -(0.73) -(0.20)  -(1.21)    >24 months from IPO (0.90) (1.34)  -(0.25) 
High analysts coverage  0.15  0.32 -0.07 Low analysts coverage 0.02 0.07 -0.05
above NYSE median  (1.31) (2.25) -(0.38)    below NYSE median (0.18) (0.46)  -(0.25) 
Panel B2: analysts characteristics 
Affiliated  -0.46 -0.43 -0.54 Non affiliated 0.07 0.18 -0.07
  -(0.80) -(0.67)  -(0.42)  (0.64) (1.26)  -(0.41) 
Large brokerage firm  0.10   0.32  (0.19)  Small brokerage firm 0.79   0.72  0.88 
  (0.84) (1.99) -(1.22)  (1.20) (0.90)  (0.80) 
Panel C2: institutions characteristics 
Ivy league  0.23  0.54 -0.17 Not ivy league -0.05 -0.06 -0.03
  (1.47) (2.38) -(0.83)     -(0.35) -(0.34)  -(0.14) 
Top 5 most linked  -0.03 0.06 -0.14 Not Top 5 most linked 0.18 0.34 -0.03
  -(0.18) (0.30) -(0.64)     (1.36) (1.88)  -(0.16) 
School adjusted returns  0.06 0.15 -0.06 School adjusted returns  0.08 0.20 -0.07




 Figure 1: XYZ Corp 
This figure shows returns of the XYZ Corp. around the upgrade by a linked analyst and return on its 






















XYZ Corp. DGTW benchmark portoflio
Earnings announcement
CFM announces its intention to acquire XYZ
Rumors of a possible acquisition
XYZ Upgraded to BUY
Earnings announcement
Rumors of a possible acquisition
Merger completed
Rumors of a possible acquisition
 Figure 2: Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns, 1993-2006 
This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to 
the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board 
member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks 
upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks 
downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the 
returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 















BUY, no shared educational background SELL, no shared educational background
BUY, analyst connected to senior management or board of directors SELL, analyst connected to senior management or board of directors
 Figure 3: Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns, pre Reg. FD 
This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to 
the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board 
member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks 
upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks 
downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the 
returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 













BUY, no shared educational background SELL, no shared educational background
BUY, analyst connected to senior management or board of directors SELL, analyst connected to senior management or board of directors
 Figure 4: Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns, post Reg. FD 
This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to 
the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board 
member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks 
upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks 
downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the 
returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 

















BUY,  no shared educational background SELL, no shared educational background
BUY, analyst linked to senior management or board of directors SELL, analyst linked to senior management or board of directors
 